¿Piensan igual los directivos actuales y futuros? Experimento con subastas de capacidad de GNL by Otamendi, Francisco Javier & Doncel, Luis Miguel
Cuadernos de Economía (2017) 40,  135--146
www.elsevier.es/cesjef
Cuadernos de economía
ARTICLE
Do current  and  future  managers  think  alike?
An experiment  with  LNG  capacity  auctions
Francisco Javier Otamendi ∗, Luis Miguel Doncel
Universidad  Rey  Juan  Carlos,  Departamento  de  Economía  Aplicada  I,  Paseo  Artilleros  s/n,  28032  Madrid,  Spain
Received 2  June  2015;  accepted  23  February  2016
Available  online  24  March  2016
JEL
CLASSIFICATION
C910;
A220
KEYWORDS
Auctions;
Professionals;
LNG  market;
Bidding  patterns;
Experiments
Abstract  An  experiment  has  been  carried  out  in  the  laboratory  to  assess  the  difference  in  the
bidding behaviour  between  current  managers  of  an  energy  company  and  future  managers  or
university  students  of  Economics.  The  novelty  of  the  experiment  is  that  it  has  precisely  mimicked
a real  capacity  auction  of  LNG  off-loading  and  that  the  professionals  that  have  participated
belong  to  the  energy  company  that  is  responsible  for  the  auctions.  The  experiments  show
that the  laboratory  setting  is  appropriate  both  for  teaching  and  experimentation.  The  research
results demonstrate  that  professionals  bid  higher  than  students  and  that  women  bid  higher  than
men.
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el comportamiento  de  licitación  entre  los  directivos  actuales  de  una  empresa  energética  y  los
futuros directivos  o  estudiantes  universitarios  de  Economía.  La  novedad  del  ensayo  es  que  ha
imitado con  precisión  una  subasta  de  capacidad  de  descarga  de  GNL  y  que  los  profesionales  que
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. Introduction
ince  Chamberlin  (1948),  games  and  simulation  resources
ot  only  have  been  a  powerful  ally  to  study  the  application
f  individual  or  collective  decisions  and  actions  regarding
he  theoretical  model  (Liu  et  al.,  2011)  but  also  have  been
idely  used  in  ﬁrm’s  strategy  and  marketing  plans  (Gavetti
t  al.,  2005;  Gary,  2005;  Otamendi  and  Doncel,  2012) as  well
s  to  foster  managers  education  (Pfahl  et  al.,  2004).
Besides,  Information  and  Communication  Technology
as  facilitated  student’s  acquisition  of  the  cognitive  skills
equired  for  analysis  (Lim  and  Barnes,  2005)  and  accelerated
 more  efﬁcient  learning  process  (Akinsola  and  Animasahun,
007).  That  is  a  crucial  reason  of  the  extensive  use  of  simu-
ation  activities  in  students  teaching  (Rutten  et  al.,  2012).
This  research  describes  the  combination  of  both  tech-
ologies  through  the  application  of  an  auction  simulation
ool  to  teach  both  managers  and  students  and  com-
ares  their  experimental  behaviour.  There  have  been  some
ttempts  to  compare  students  vs.  non-students  in  inter-
et  auctions  (for  example,  Depositario  et  al.,  2009;  Wilcox,
000)  but,  up  to  our  knowledge,  no  experiments  have  been
un  with  both  types  of  participants  within  speciﬁc  markets.
oreover,  there  are  no  references  to  comparisons  in  which
he  experiment  in  which  the  professionals  belong  to  the
ndustrial  market  that  serves  as  the  basis  for  the  simulation
n  the  laboratory.
As  a  testbench,  we  use  professionals  of  Enagás,  the  Span-
sh  owner  of  the  pipelines  that  transport  the  LNG  (liqueﬁed
atural  gas)  into  Spain,  and  economics  and  business  students
f  the  Universidad  Rey  Juan  Carlos  in  Madrid.
At  the  outset  of  the  research,  Enagás  was  in  the  need
o  learn  about  the  design  and  execution  of  auctions  in  gen-
ral  and  capacity  auctions  in  particular  due  to  the  upcoming
uture  change  in  regulation  imposed  by  the  EU  Commission.
raditionally  the  rights  to  ofﬂoad  the  LNG  tankers  in  the  har-
ours  were  bought  and  traded  over  the  counter  (OTC)  or  not
ven  traded  at  all.  The  EU  directives  on  the  liberalisation  of
he  electricity  and  the  gas  markets  require  nowadays  the
evelopment  of  markets  in  every  stage  of  the  supply  chain
f  LNG.  Besides  the  utilities  markets  currently  available  for
he  products  or  commodities,  the  trend  is  to  develop  capac-
ty  markets,  that  is,  the  rights  to  move  the  product  along
he  supply  chain.  In  this  context,  human  capital  becomes
ssential  in  order  to  understand  the  rules  that  would  govern
he  capacity  auctions  of  time  slots  for  ofﬂoading  LNG.  The
ocus  of  this  article  is  on  the  auctions  of  short-terms  adjust-
ent  of  capacities  at  the  harbours  in  order  to  optimise  the
utﬂow  of  the  LNG  from  tankers  to  reservoirs  in  order  to
uarantee  service.
By  setting  a  laboratory  experiment  to  resemble  capacity
arkets  to  ofﬂoad  LNG,  we  proceeded  to  design  an  inter-
ace  for  professionals  to  better  understand  how  to  auction
ithin  the  new  market  conditions  affected  by  the  regula-
ions  imposed  by  the  EU.  The  simulation  had  to  cover  both
he  teaching  of  auction  theory  as  well  as  the  training  of
he  professionals  in  their  upcoming  duties  of  taking  quick
ecisions  in  online  auctions  through  an  experiment.With  the  laboratory  experiment  installed  and  running  at
he  Enagás  ofﬁces,  and  fostering  the  university-job  mar-
et  relationship,  we  applied  the  same  learning  setting  at
he  Universidad  Rey  Juan  Carlos  and  followed  the  same
h
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xperimental  process  with  Economics  and  Business  Adminis-
ration  students.
After  four  sessions  of  experimentation,  two  with  profes-
ionals  and  two  with  students,  the  objective  was  to  test  if
he  behaviour  of  both  groups,  professionals  or  current  man-
gers  and  students  or  future  managers,  during  the  auction
xperiments  were  similar  or  differ  in  terms  of  the  status
n  their  career.  We  also  looked  for  differences  in  terms  of
ender  and  auction  types.  As  a  by-product,  the  aim  was  to
emonstrate  if  this  experimental  technology  tool  is  reliable
nd  appropriate  for  educational  purpose  of  both  professional
anagers  and  students.
As  a result,  we  have  found  that  professionals  bid  higher
han  students  and  women  bid  higher  than  men.  The  dif-
erences  among  auctions  types  are  not  so  straightforward,
ndicating  that  both  groups  should  be  further  trained  in  the-
retical  concepts.
The  article  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  2  explains
he  basic  theory  that  is  necessary  to  understand  the  experi-
ent  and  that  was  transmitted  to  the  participants.  Section
 details  the  design  of  the  experiment  and  Section  4  explains
he  results  in  terms  of  the  different  factors  that  have  been
ddressed  in  the  experiments:  status  (professionals  vs.  stu-
ents),  gender  (women  vs  men)  and  auction  type  (First  vs
ickrey).  Section  5  is  used  to  discuss  the  results  and  con-
lude.
. Background in experimental auctions
 speciﬁc  ﬁeld  in  auction  theory  studies  the  design  and  exe-
ution  of  games  in  which  multiple  players  try  to  buy  different
oods.  The  players  have  to  place  a  BID,  and  therefore  are
sually  called  bidders,  according  to  the  VALUE  that  the  good
s  worth  for  them.  The  objective  in  an  auction  from  a  partic-
pant’s  point  of  view  is  to  buy  goods  by  placing  appropriate
IDS  but  with  the  awarded  price  to  pay  being  as  low  as  possi-
le,  at  least  lower  than  one’s  own  perceived  VALUE.  In  other
ords,  the  proﬁt  obtained  by  a  participant  will  be  ‘‘awarded
rice--value’’,  and  should  be  non-negative.
There  are  different  auction  mechanisms  in  terms  of  the
election  of  the  winner  of  the  auction  and  the  price  that  is
hen  paid  for  the  good.  In  this  article,  and  following  LNG
arket  possibilities,  we  resort  only  to  the  class  of  the  so-
alled  sealed-bid  auctions  in  which  each  participant  submits
 bid  within  an  allotted  time.  But  we  use  two  different
warding  mechanisms:  First  Price  (F)  and  Second  Price  or
ickrey  (V).
Under  both  mechanisms,  the  winner  is  the  participant
hat  places  the  highest  bid.  However,  the  price  to  pay  is  dif-
erent.  Under  F,  the  participant  with  the  highest  bid  has  to
ay  an  awarded  price  that  corresponds  to  one’s  own  bid.  The
roﬁt  is  then  calculated  as  ‘‘awarded  price--own  bid’’,  proﬁt
hat  could  be  negative  if  the  bid  is  higher  than  the  value.  The
ifference  between  real  life  and  laboratory  experiments  is
hat  the  VALUE  is  calculated  by  the  participant  in  real  life
uctions  and  is  randomly  assigned  by  a  computer  in  experi-
ental  settings.
Under  V,  the  awarded  price  to  the  participant  with  the
ighest  bid  is  not  one’s  own  bid,  but  the  second  high-
st  bid,  somewhat  lower.  The  chances  to  get  a  negative
roﬁt  under  V  are  lower  than  under  F  with  the  same  bid,
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Figure  1  Results  of  the  bidding  strategy.
but  are  still  feasible.  The  winner  obtains  in  this  case  a
‘‘proﬁt  =  value  −  second  highest  bid’’.  The  proﬁt  for  those
that  do  not  buy  the  good  is  0  in  any  case  (F  or  V).
So,  what  is  the  bid  that  should  be  placed  as  a  function  of
the  participant’s  value?  What  should  the  strategy  to  follow
be  in  order  to  earn  proﬁts?
In  this  context,  we  will  focus  on  understanding  and
deﬁning  the  bidding  strategies  and  functions  that  underlie
players’  behaviour.  This  strategy  is  called  the  BIDDING  FUNC-
TION  which  relates  the  bid  placed  to  buy  a  certain  good  as
a  function  of  the  perceived  value  of  the  good.
Auction  theorists  develop  bidding  functions  for  certain
situations  that  are  mathematically  solvable  with  respect  to
the  restrictions  that  are  imposed  on  the  game  according
to  Nash  equilibrium.  Experimental  economists  calculate  the
bidding  function  by  setting  lab  experiments  and  test  the  the-
ory  and  analyse  the  difference  in  behaviour  between  the  bids
of  the  participants  or  players  and  what  the  theory  predicts.
The  bidding  function  is  increasing  and  varies  as  a  func-
tion  of  the  game  that  is  being  played.  The  bidding  function
corresponding  to  bids  that  are  exactly  equal  to  the  value  is
depicted  in  Fig.  1.  This  is  a  clear  threshold  in  bidding  since
the  individual  results  could  be  negative  if  the  bid  is  higher
than  the  value  but  always  positive  if  the  bid  is  lower  than
the  value.
The  bidding  strategy  differs  among  players  and  varies  as  a
function  of  the  type  of  good  or  the  sector  (LNG  and  capacity
in  this  case),  the  number  of  players  involved,  the  informa-
tion  they  receive  before  and  during  the  execution  of  the
auction  and  the  type  of  auction  that  is  carried  out.  Many
experiments  have  been  set  to  test  strategies  under  differ-
ent  auction  formats  (see  Kagel  and  Levin,  2011,  for  their  last
complete  survey)  but  none  have  been  found  that  address  the
differences  among  students  and  professional  in  a  very  spe-
ciﬁc  real  market  in  which  knowledge  of  the  environment  is
crucial.
3. Experimental design
To  proceed  with  the  laboratory  experiment,  an  auction  sim-
ulator  has  been  particularised  to  study  capacity  auctions
in  general  and  in  the  energy  market  in  particular.  Out  of
the  available  options,  we  have  selected  econport  due  to
its  wide  use  and  its  functional  interface  (Hsinchun  et  al.,
2003;  Cox  and  Swarthout,  2005),  as  well  as  its  enormous
s
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arameterisation  potential  that  favours  its  particularisation
o  capacity  auctions.  Econport  was  designed  by  the  Exper-
mental  Economics  Centre  of  Georgia  State  University  as  a
omputer-assisted  teaching  and  research  tool  in  economics.
t  incorporates  one  module  that  allows  for  simulating  auc-
ions.  In  particular,  it  includes  one  routine  that  resembles
ne  market  in  which  one  seller  offers  several  goods  to  dif-
erent  bidders.  It  is  also  the  easiest  one  to  interact  with  by
he  professor  whenever  in  the  classroom,  that  is,  it  is  the
ost  teaching  oriented  simulator  but  it  is  also  well  suited
or  experimental  research.
A  ﬁrst  simulation  environment  was  set  in  order  to  show
nagás’  employees  how  a  capacity  market  could  be  designed
nd  run.  Several  games  were  developed  in  order  to  teach
arket  concepts  like  monopoly,  collusion,  perfect  informa-
ion,  efﬁciency  and  entry  barriers,  according  to  different
ypes  of  auctions.  A  ﬁrst  teaching  course  was  carried  out
ith  professionals  during  April  2012  with  success.  However,
here  appeared  the  need  to  develop  more-realistic  case
tudies  that  further  mimic  the  ofﬂoading  of  LNG.  Also,  a
ew  fact  arose:  the  necessity  to  avoid  the  winner’s  course,
he  adverse  selection  effect  inherent  in  winning  the  auction
Capen  et  al.,  1971).  To  avoid  buyer’s  curse  (Kagel  and  Levin,
986),  we  decided  afterwards  to  give  a  prize  to  the  overall
inner  of  the  session,  preferring  this  reward  to  money  since
rofessionals  are  involved  (Kagel  and  Levin,  2011).  A  second
ession  with  professionals  in  May  was  very  smooth  and  it  was
he  one  that  has  been  used  as  a test-bench  ever  since,  and
hown  in  later  sections  of  this  article.
The  experimental  setting  of  the  LNG  capacity  auction  was
hen  ready  for  trials  with  students  and  professionals.  Each
ession  of  the  experiment  lasts  about  3  h,  with  the  following
rogramme:
 Theoretical  explanation  of  the  auction  types.
 Access  to  the  web  simulator  by  the  participants.
 Round  0:  One  experiment  with  4  periods,  so  that  the
participants  get  acquainted  with  the  simulator.  The
experiment  is  repeated  for  each  of  the  auction  types  in
order  to  know  the  characteristics  and  properties  of  both
auction  types.  The  values  are  sampled  from  a  distribution
of  values  (V  dist)  that  follows  a  Uniform  distribution  that
ranges  between  0  and  20  experimental  monetary  units,
U(0,20).
 Round  1:  One  experiment  with  6  periods,  repeated  for
each  auction  type.  The  values  are  sampled  from  a
distribution  of  values  (V  dist)  that  follows  a Uniform  dis-
tribution  that  ranges  between  5  and  15,  U(5,15).
 Round  2:  One  experiment  with  20  periods,  repeated
for  each  auction  type.  The  values  are  sampled  from  a
distribution  of  values  (V  dist)  that  follows  a Uniform  dis-
tribution  that  ranges  between  0  and  20,  U(0,20).
The  overall  winner  is  the  participant  with  the  highest
roﬁt  after  adding  the  proﬁts  of  the  Round  2  over  the  two
uction  types  (F,  V).
One  initial  session  was  held  with  20  business  professionals
n  June  26th,  2012,  9  males  and  11  females.  Two  identical
essions  were  then  carried  out  with  students:
 On  November  16th,  2012,  with  24  undergraduates  stu-
dents  in  Economics,  17  male  and  7  female.
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Table  1  Difference  in  average  proﬁt  among  factor  values
(t-test).
Factors  Averages  Difference  p-value
Status PRO  STU −0.59 0.0352−0.20  0.39
Gender WOM  MEN
0.25  0.40370.20  −0.05
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Table  2  Difference  in  average  proﬁt  among  the  groups  of
participants.
Auction  type  Status  Gender  Total
First  PROFESSIONALS  WOMEN  0.09
MEN  0.01
STUDENTS  WOMEN  0.09
MEN  −0.05
Vickrey  PROFESSIONALS  WOMEN  −0.14
MEN  −1.12
STUDENTS  WOMEN  1.00
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type
FIR  VIC −0.10 0.71180.04  0.15
 On  November  30th,  2012,  with  26  undergraduates  stu-
dents  in  Business  Administration,  9  male  and  17  female.
A  second  session  with  professionals  took  place  on  May
2nd,  2013,  with  6  males  and  7  females.
Our  overall  sample  size  of  83  participants  is  comparable
o  that  of  other  experiments  with  asymmetric  information:
2  (Brocas  et  al.,  2015),  78  (Brocas  et  al.,  2014) or  78  (Brocas
t  al.,  2012).  We  feel  therefore  that  our  current  analysis
as  sufﬁcient  power  and  it  is  sufﬁciently  close  to  standard
ractices  in  experimental  economics  to  be  conﬁdent  that
he  sample  size  is  large  enough  for  meaningful  conclusions
n  the  paradigm  we  are  focusing  on.
. Experimental results
hree  factors  are  studied  under  this  experimental  design:
 Status  of  the  participants,  either  professionals  (PRO)  or
students  (STU).
 Gender  of  the  participants,  either  women  (WOM)  or  men
(MEN).
 Type  of  auction,  either  First  (FIR)  or  Vickrey  (VIC).
The  analysis  is  performed  for  each  of  the  individual
hree  factors  using  the  results  of  Round  2,  that  of  the  prize
or  the  winner.  Some  results  are  all  shown  for  the  four
reatment  groups,  namely,  WP  (Women  Professionals),  MP
Men  Professionals),  WS  (Women  Students)  and  MS  (Male
tudents),  across  auction  types.  In  some  cases,  the  analy-
is  will  be  particularised  for  the  three-way  interaction  of
tatus--gender--type.
.1.  Proﬁts
he  winner  of  any  auction  is  the  participant  that  submits
he  highest  bid.  Its  proﬁts  are  calculated  as  the  differ-
nce  between  the  random  VALUE  assigned  to  the  participant
inus  the  awarded  PRICE,  which  will  be  winner’s  own  bid
the  highest  bid)  in  the  case  of  the  FIRST  price  auctions,
nd  the  second  highest  bid  in  the  case  of  VICKREY  auctions.
Table  1  includes  the  average  proﬁt  that  corresponds  to
he  winning  bids  for  each  of  the  three  factors  that  are
eing  studied.  It  also  includes  a  difference  of  means  test
o  assess  for  signiﬁcance.  The  highest  difference  is  found
etween  professionals  and  students,  with  students  obtaining
igniﬁcantly  more  proﬁt  on  average.  Professionals  show  even
egative  average  proﬁts,  indicating  bidding  above  value.
t
b
t
tMEN  0.55
Total general 0.10
o  differences  are  found  across  auction  types  or  in  gender,
lthough  men’s  average  proﬁt  is  negative.
Table  2  depicts  the  results  for  each  of  the  4  groups  of
articipants  separated  by  auction  type.  Students  clearly  out-
erform  professionals  in  VICKREY  auctions  but  not  in  FIRST.
OMEN  get  higher  proﬁts  across  all  combinations.
Interestingly  enough,  the  variability  of  proﬁts  is  much
igher  in  VICKREY  than  in  FIRST  and  in  PROFESSIONALS  over
TUDENTS  (Fig.  2).
.2.  Efﬁciency
uction  goods  should  be  awarded  to  the  participant  that  val-
es  the  good  the  most.  As  such,  the  efﬁciency  is  measured  as
he  proportion  of  times  that  the  good  is  awarded  to  the  par-
icipant  with  the  highest  value.  Table  3  includes  the  results,
howing  in  column  ‘‘Count’’  the  count  of  goods  that  have
een  auctioned,  in  column  ‘‘Efﬁcient’’  the  count  of  goods
hat  have  been  awarded  to  the  participant  with  the  highest
alue,  and  therefore,  in  column  ‘‘Efﬁciency’’,  the  ratio  of
‘Efﬁcient’’  over  ‘‘Count’’.
The  overall  efﬁciency  is  70%,  as  111  of  the  auctions  were
fﬁcient  whereas  47  goods  were  assigned  to  a  participant
ith  not-the-maximum  drawn  value.  The  efﬁciency  is  higher
or  STUDENTS  for  both  types  of  auctions  (77%  and  75%  for
TUDENTS  and  72%  and  56%  for  PROFESSIONALS,  for  FIRST
nd  VICKREY,  respectively).  In  terms  of  gender,  WOMEN
articipants  defend  their  high  valuations  consistently  more
ften  than  MEN  do,  for  every  combination  of  auction  type
nd  participant  status.
If the  three  factors  (STATUS--TYPE--GENDER)  are  indepen-
ently  studied  (Table  4, where  I  corresponds  to  left  and  II
o  the  right  value  of  each  factor  stated  in  the  subtraction),
here  are  signiﬁcant  differences  found,  with  higher  efﬁcien-
ies  of  STUDENTS  over  PROFESSIONALS  and  also  of  WOMEN
ver  MEN.
.3.  Bidding  functions
oth  the  aggregate  results  of  proﬁts  and  efﬁciency  have  to
e  explained  in  terms  of  the  participants’  bidding  strategies,
hat  is,  the  bidding  behaviour  as  a  function  of  the  value.  If
ids  are  higher,  the  number  of  goods  awarded  is  higher  but
he  proﬁt  might  be  lower  if  the  bid  is  too  high.  Bids  above
he  value  may  even  result  in  negative  proﬁts.
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Figure  2  Boxplot  of  proﬁts.
Table  3  Efﬁciency  across  combination  of  values  of  the  factors.
Status  Auction  type Gender  Count  Efﬁcient  Efﬁciency
PROFESSIONALS  First  FEMALE  25  18  72.00%
MALE 14  10  71.43%
Total First  39  28  71.79%
Vickrey FEMALE  26  16  61.54%
MALE 13  6  46.15%
Total Vickrey  39  22  56.41%
STUDENTS  First  FEMALE  22  18  81.82%
MALE 18  13  72.22%
Total First 40  31  77.50%
Vickrey FEMALE  18  17  94.44%
MALE 22  13  59.09%
Total Vickrey  40  30  75.00%
Total general  158  111  70.25%
Table  4  Efﬁciency  across  combination  of  values  of  the  factors  (test  of  proportions).
Factors  I  II  DIF  (I--II)  p-value
PRO--STU  PRO  =  64.10%  STU  =  76.25%  −12.15%  0.0925
FIR--VIC FIR  =  74.68%  VIC  =  75.00%  −0.32%  0.9691
EN  =
It  is  clear  that  the  average  experimental  behaviour  is
close  but  under  the  ‘‘bid  =  value’’  threshold,  with  no  clear
cut  differences  in  the  distribution  of  the  group  behaviours.1
1 Using the Mann--Whitney test for equal distributions, all the pair-WOM--MEN WOM  =  75.82%  M
The  experimental  bidding  functions  are  shown  in  Fig.  3.
The  graph  includes  the  drawn  VALUES  in  the  x-axis,  grouped
in  bins  of  1.  In  other  words,  values  have  been  truncated  to
the  integer  (0.7  is  truncated  to  0  and  placed  in  bin  0--1,  .  . .).
The  average  BID  for  the  corresponding  bin  is  represented  in
the  y-axis.  Eight  bidding  functions  are  shown,  each  one  cor-
responding  to  a  feasible  combination  of  type--status--gender.
The  overall  function  is  also  shown  with  a  dashed  line.  The
function  that  corresponds  to  ‘‘bids  equal  to  the  value’’  is
included  with  a  dotted  line  for  comparative  purposes.
w
d
a
v 62.69%  13.14%  0.0766ise tests of experimental functions do not show any signiﬁcant
ifferences over the whole range of possible values. We will look for
nd ﬁnd however differences in average bids over speciﬁc ranges of
alues in the upcoming paragraphs.
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Table  5  OLS  regression  of  bids.
Term Coef  SE  coef  T  p-value
Constant  0.691  0.137  −5.06  0.000
Value 0.961  0.010  100.74  0.000
Gender 0.605  0.109  5.55  0.000
Status 0.777  0.111  6.97  0.000
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4Figure  3  Experim
ven  then,  it  looks  like  female  students  tend  to  adjust
he  bids  to  their  values,  obtaining  the  goods  that  they
re  supposed  to  at  a  price  that  is  lower  than  the  value,
nd  therefore,  obtaining  a  proﬁt.  Aggressive  bidding  above
alue,  especially  in  VICKREY,  may  result  in  losses,  especially
or  MEN  and  PROFESSIONALS.
The  experimental  behaviour  of  the  participants  is  further
nalysed  via  the  aggregate  or  structural  bidding  functions,
sing  OLS  estimation.  Eq.  (1)  and  Table  5 include  the  regres-
ion  results  for  the  general  behaviour.  All  the  coefﬁcients
re  signiﬁcantly  different  than  0  (Table  5),  with  r2 =  75%.
id  =  −0.691  +  0.961  Value  +  0.605  Gender
+  0.777  Status  −  0.295  Type  (1)
The  bids  are  higher  with  the  VALUE,  for  WOMEN  (quantita-
ively  coded  as  Gender  =  1)  rather  than  MEN  (Gender  =  0),  for
ROFESSIONALS  (coded  as  Status  =  1)  rather  than  STUDENTS
Status  =  0)  and  for  VICKREY  (coded  as  Type  =  0)  rather  than
IRST  (Type  =  1).
If  all  the  categorical  factors  are  considered  as  qualita-
ive,  the  analysis  might  be  pursued  further  so  as  to  perceive
ifference  in  the  behaviour  of  the  different  groups  of  partic-
pants.  Table  6  includes  all  the  calculated  bidding  functions
s  a  function  of  value  (BID  =  CONSTANT  +  SLOPE  *  VALUE),  as
ell  as  the  p-values  corresponding  to  testing  that  the  con-
tant  and  the  slope  are  equal  to  0.
The  BIDS  are  in  all  the  cases  somewhat  lower  than  the
ALUE  (in  fact,  0.96  *  VALUE),  with  the  constant  representing
L
w
aType 0.295  0.109  −2.71  0.007
 small  deviation  that  reﬂects  the  combination  of  status,
ender  and  auction  type.
Positive  deviations,  that  is,  higher  bids,  correspond  to
EMALE  (0.121)  and  PROFESSIONALS  (0.293).  FEMALE  PRO-
ESSIONALS  bid  higher  (0.563)  both  for  First  (0.396)  and  for
ickrey  (0.691).  Also  PROFESSIONALS  show  positive  devia-
ions  under  VICKREY  (0.423).
Negative  deviations,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  character-
stic  of  MEN  (−0.540),  STUDENTS  (−0.529),  FIRST  (−0.371)
nd  VICKREY  (−0.067).  All  the  two-way  and  three-way  inter-
ctions  with  STUDENTS  are  negative,  with  a  maximum  for
ALE-STUDENTS-First  (−0.986).
.4.  Bidding  proﬁleset  us  further  discuss  the  difference  in  bidding  strategies
ithin  the  three  factors  that  have  been  analysed  in  this
rticle.  Each  ﬁnding  is  based  on  the  results  depicted  in  the
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Table  6  Categorical  OLS  regression.
R2 =  75% p-values
Constant  Slope
Overall  average  Bid  =  −0.201  +  0.959  Value  0.06  0.00
WOMEN Bid  =  0.121  +  0.959  Value  0.31 0.00
MEN Bid  =  −0.540  +  0.959  Value  0.00
PROFESSIONALS  Bid  =  0.293  +  0.959  Value  0.02
STUDENTS Bid  =  −0.529  +  0.959  Value  0.00
First Bid  =  −0.371  +  0.960  Value  0.00
Vickrey Bid  =  −0.067  +  0.960  Value 0.00
First -- PROFESSIONALS Bid  =  0.125  +  0.961  Value 0.38 0.00
First --  STUDENTS  Bid  =  −0.695  +  0.961  Value  0.00
Vickrey --  PROFESSIONALS  Bid  =  0.423  +  0.961  Value  0.00
Vickrey --  STUDENTS  Bid  =  −0.397  +  0.961  Value  0.00
First --  WOMEN  Bid  =  −0.048  +  0.961  Value  0.72
First --  MEN Bid  =  −0.707  +  0.961  Value  0.00
Vickrey --  WOMEN Bid  =  0.252  +  0.961  Value 0.00
Vickrey  --  MEN Bid  =  −0.407  +  0.961  Value  0.00
PROFESSIONALS  -- WOMEN Bid  =  0.563  +  0.959  Value 0.00
PROFESSIONALS  -- MEN Bid  =  −0.044  +  0.959  Value 0.00
STUDENTS  WOMEN Bid  =  −0.216  +  0.959  Value 0.00
STUDENTS  MEN Bid  =  −0.823  +  0.959  Value 0.00
WOMEN  PROFESSIONALS  --  First  Bid  =  0.396  +  0.961  Value  0.00 0.00
WOMEN PROFESSIONALS  --  Vickrey  Bid  =  0.691  +  0.961  Value
WOMEN  STUDENTS  --  First  Bid  =  −0.381  +  0.961  Value
WOMEN  STUDENTS  --  Vickrey  Bid  =  −0.086  +  0.961  Value
MEN PROFESSIONALS  --  First  Bid  =  −0.210  +  0.961  Value
MEN PROFESSIONALS  --  Vickrey  Bid  =  0.085  +  0.961  Value
MEN STUDENTS  --  First  Bid  =  −0.986  +  0.961  Value
MEN STUDENTS  --  Vickrey  Bid  =  −0.691  +  0.961  Value
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tprevious  section  and  explained  in  terms  of  the  available
literature.
4.4.1.  Finding  1:  Professionals  bid  higher  than  students
From  Fig.  2,  both  of  them,  professionals  and  students  show  a
similar  bidding  pattern  (Dyer  et  al.,  1989;  Depositario  et  al.,
2009),  mainly  in  the  intermediate  values  of  the  distribution,
whereas  some  disturbances  are  exhibited  in  both  tails  (high
and  low  VALUES).  At  the  bottom  of  the  range,  there  seems
to  be  an  overbidding  effect  and  the  reverse  occurs  at  the
higher  values  of  the  interval  of  values.
A  more  detailed  statistical  analysis  is  carried  out  in
Table  7.  For  each  bin  of  values,  the  table  entries  show  the
average  difference  in  bids  for  the  two  STATUS  categories
(PROFESSIONAL--STUDENTS),  as  a  TOTAL  or  just  for  a  combi-
nation  of  one  or  two  of  the  other  categories.  If  the  average
difference  value  is  statistically  different  than  0,  the  signiﬁ-
cance  is  indicated  with  asterisks  (*  for  0.10,  **  for  0.05  and
***  for  0.01)  and  a  letter  indicating  the  factor  setting  that
is  larger  is  included  (P  for  PROFESSIONALS  and  S  for  STU-
DENTS).  The  bins  of  values  are  grouped  in  four  groups  of  5
to  differentiate  low  values  (0--5),  low-intermediate  values
(5--10),  high-intermediate  values  (10--15)  and  high  values
(15--20).  Bidders  with  a  VALUE  in  this  last  group  should  place
r
b
t
mhe  largest  bid  and  be  awarded  with  the  good  being  auc-
ioned.  Values  under  10  provide  a  very  low  probability  of
inning.
Only  cells  with  a  signiﬁcantly  larger  bid  for  professionals
P)  are  found,  except  for  a  single  S  (larger  students’  bid)  for
he  combination  of  FIR  WOM  and  values  between  7  and  8.
he  count  of  signiﬁcant  P’s  is  larger  in  the  column  TOTAL,
ICKREY  and  MEN,  indicating  that  these  PROFESSIONAL
roups  bid  higher  than  their  STUDENTS  counterparts, even
bove  value.  The  average  difference  is  as  high  as  3.23  for
alues  around  18  and  bids  of  MEN  participating  in  VICKREY
uctions.
These  results  show  that  experience  is  not  a guarantee
f  success  in  auction  laboratory  settings  (Burns,  1985;  Dyer
t  al.,  1989; or  Garrat  et  al.,  2012).  Professionals  tend  to
verbid  in  simulation  environments  due  to  the  use  of  a
eductive  reasoning  with  short-cuts  and  the  employment
f  mental  models  in  the  context  of  the  framework  of  the
imulation  (Johnson-Laird,  1999),  without  considering  insti-
utional  factors  which  protect  them  from  aggressive  bids  in
eality.  In  addition,  Vickrey  auctions  provokes  a  tendency  to
idding  in  excess  to  the  value  because  this  fact  improves
he  probability  of  winning  but  just  the  second  high  bid  price
ust  be  paid  (Kagel  et  al.,  1987).
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Table  7  Difference  in  average  bid:  Professional  vs  Student  (P--S).  Signiﬁcant  at  0.10,  *;  at  0.05,  **;  at  0.01,  ***.
Value  Total  FIR  VIC  WOM  MEN
0--1  0.88  P*  −0.28  1.38  P**  0.62  1.11  P*
1--2 0.56  P**  0.25  P*  0.94  P*  0.55  0.53
2--3 0.67  −0.15  1.13  0.16  1.53  P*
3--4 1.11  P*  0.62  1.27  0.80  1.26
4--5 0.71 P** 0.25  1.40  P**  0.07  1.37  P***
5--6 0.88 P** 0.82  P*  0.90  0.45  1.29  P*
6--7 1.16 P*** 0.55 1.87 P***  −0.38  2.51  P***
7--8 0.55 0.10 1.03 −0.26 1.35 P**
8--9 0.95  P**  0.65  1.30  −0.13  1.80  P**
9--10 1.47  P***  1.21  P**  1.66  P*  0.90  2.02  P**
10--11 1.30  P**  −0.46  2.86  P***  1.18  P**  1.57
11--12 0.72  1.30  P*  0.24  0.23  1.16
12--13 1.32  P***  0.87  P**  1.84  P**  0.43  2.35  P***
13--14 0.34  0.00  0.76  0.50  0.18
14--15 1.64  P***  0.07  4.01  P***  0.50  2.56  P***
15--16 1.16  P***  0.47  2.65  P***  1.71  P***  0.71  P*
16--17 −1.26  −0.60  −1.83  −1.43  −1.06
17--18 1.42  P***  0.55  2.06  P***  0.18  2.48  P***
18--19 −0.07  −0.48  0.36  0.00  −0.74
19--20 0.68  0.01  1.38  P*  −0.57  1.92  P**
Value FIR  WOM  FIR  MEN  VIC  WOM  VIC  MEN
0--1  0.21  P*  −0.72  0.76  1.92  P**
1--2 0.18  0.32  P*  0.73  0.86
2--3 −0.70  S**  0.65  0.66  2.00
3--4 0.06  0.65  1.09  1.57
4--5 −0.37  0.84  0.84  2.11  P**
5--6 −0.40  1.96  P***  0.92  0.88
6--7 −0.40  1.47  P**  −0.33  3.63  P***
7--8 −1.26  S**  1.56  P**  1.04  1.18
8--9 0.11  0.91  −0.41  3.42  P**
9--10 0.43  1.94  P**  1.24  2.17
10--11 −0.73  0.27  2.73  P***  2.86  P**
11--12 0.77  1.65  −0.16  0.68
12--13 0.36  1.44  P*  0.52  3.34  P***
13--14 −0.44  0.38  1.54  −0.17
14--15 −0.49 0.75  2.74  P*  4.76  P***
15--16 1.18  P**  −0.20  S*  2.46  P**  2.38  P**
16--17 0.09  −1.01  −2.13  −1.08
17--18 0.00  1.09  0.44  3.23  P***
18--19 −0.80 −0.73  1.23  P**  −0.44
P*  
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On  the  other  side,  students  adjust  a  bit  worse  to  the  sig-
als  received  from  the  auctions  but  they  are  not  affected  by
verbidding.  In  that  case,  the  promise  to  receive  a  reward
y  the  person  with  bigger  proﬁt  eludes  buyer’s  curse  which
onstitutes  an  advantage  to  replicate  the  real  world  where
egative  proﬁts  should  be  avoided.  In  fact,  in  some  types  of
xperimental  ﬁrst  price  auctions,  average  bidding  is  below
he  risk  neutral  Nash  equilibrium  (Neugebauer  and  Perote,
008).These  results  appear  to  be  in  consonance  with  Filiz  and
zbay  (2007)  which  indicate  the  existence  of  two  types
f  regret.  ‘‘Loser’s  regret’’  if  a  loser  bidder  could  have
on  with  a  higher  bid  which  generates  overbidding  and  the
V
T
R
t0.72  1.68
‘winner’s  regret’’  if  a  winning  bidder  could  have  won  with
ess  money  obtaining  a  greater  proﬁt.  This  last  regret  will
enerate  underbidding.
Therefore,  it  seems  that  the  results  of  the  auction
ehaviour  of  the  professionals  are  affected  more  by  a  psy-
hological  conduct  than  by  a  mistake  in  the  simulation  game.
.4.2.  Finding  2:  Average  bids  are  similar  across  auction
ypes  regardless  of  the  status;  variability  is  higher  in
ickrey  auctions
able  8  shows  the  average  difference  for  FIRST  (F)  and  VICK-
EY  (V)  auctions.  There  is  not  a  clear-cut  decision  on  which
ype  produces  higher  bids.  The  F’s  and  V’s  are  scattered
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Table  8  Difference  in  average  bid:  First  vs  Vickrey  (F--V).  Signiﬁcant  at  0.10,  *;  at  0.05,  **;  at  0.01,  ***.
Value  Total  PRO  STU  WOM  MEN
0--1  −0.70  V*  −1.67  V***  −0.01  −1.06  V**  −0.35
1--2 −0.47  V*  −0.90  V**  −0.21  −0.92  V**  −0.06
2--3 −1.30  V***  −2.05  V***  −0.77  V*  −1.09  V***  −1.62  V**
3--4 −0.83  V*  −1.14  −0.48  −0.43  −0.70
4--5 −0.10 −0.78 V**  0.37  0.19  −0.44
5--6 −0.17 −0.20 −0.11 0.23  −0.55
6--7 −1.13 V** −1.96 V***  −0.64 −1.58  V***  −0.84
7--8 −0.26 −0.77 0.16 −0.53 −0.03
8--9 −0.33  −0.71  −0.06  −0.33  0.02
9--10 −0.02  −0.27  0.18  0.11  −0.08
10--11 −0.18  −2.17  V***  1.15  −0.29  −0.03
11--12 −1.04  V**  −0.41  −1.48  V**  −0.61  −1.41  V*
12--13 0.39  −0.15  0.82  0.20  0.61
13--14 0.43  −0.05  0.70  0.74  0.06
14--15 1.20  −1.45  V**  2.49  F**  −0.19  2.12  F**
15--16 −0.23  −1.62  V**  0.56  −1.66  V**  0.86
16--17 0.72  1.54  0.31  1.75  F*  −0.28
17--18 0.21  −0.69  V***  0.82  −0.38  V**  0.43
18--19 −0.16  −0.68  0.16  −1.18  V**  1.04
19--20 −0.96  −1.77  V**  −0.40  −1.24  V**  −0.83
Value PRO  WOM  PRO  MEN  STU  WOM  STU  MEN
0--1  −1.38  V***  −1.90  V**  −0.82  0.74  F***
1--2 −1.19  V*  −0.50  −0.63  V**  0.05
2--3 −1.88  V**  −2.42  V**  −0.52  −1.07
3--4 −1.04  V**  −1.09  V*  −0.01  −0.17
4--5 −0.44  −1.33  0.78  F**  −0.06
5--6 −0.52  0.42  0.79  −0.66
6--7 −1.61  −2.36  V***  −1.54  V***  −0.19
7--8 −1.88  V**  0.37  0.41  −0.01
8--9 −0.06  −1.91  V*  −0.59  0.61
9--10 −0.24  −0.46  0.57  −0.23
10--11 −2.32  V***  −1.73  1.13  F**  0.86
11--12 −0.09  −0.80  V***  −1.02  −1.76
12--13 0.12  −0.54  0.28  1.36  F**
13--14 −0.46  0.40  1.52  −0.15
14--15 −2.22 V*  −0.63  V**  1.00  F*  3.37  F***
15--16 −2.27  −0.90  −0.99  1.69  F***
16--17 2.99  F***  −0.01  0.77  F***  −0.08
17--18 −0.63  −0.80  −0.20  1.34
18--19 −2.34 0.76  F***  −0.30  V*  1.05
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a19--20 −2.77  V***  −0.55  
throughout  the  table.  Bids  for  VICKREY  are  higher  for  lower
values,  but  that  is  not  the  case  for  high  values.  It  is  striking  to
see  higher  bids  under  the  FIRST  mechanism  for  certain  values
over  15  for  different  combinations  of  type--status--gender.
Theory  predicts  that  V  should  be  higher  than  F  throughout
since  the  awarded  price  will  be  that  of  the  second  highest
bid.  It  has  been  shown  that  under  certain  conditions  (Maskin
and  Riley,  1984)  ﬁrst  price  auctions  lead  to  higher  ﬁnal  prices
(lower  bids)  than  Vickrey  auctions  in  presence  of  risk  aver-
sion  as  risk  averse  bidders  bid  more  aggressively  to  increase
his/her  probability  of  winning  in  Vickrey  auctions.  Also  the
presence  of  winner’s  curse  (Wilson,  1969;  Capen  et  al.,  1971)
imply  the  failure  of  the  winner  bidder  to  recognise  the  true
signals  and  pay  more  than  the  prize  is  worth.
s
f
w−0.21  −1.05  V**
Systematic  overbidding  could  also  be  considered  as  a  fail-
re  in  the  game  to  represent  reality,  although  it  is  usually
he  case  that  the  participants  present  bounded  rationality
nd  do  not  comprehend  completely  the  difference  between
he  two  types  of  auctions  (Kagel  and  Levin,  2011).
.4.3.  Finding  3:  Women  bid  higher  than  men
n  interesting  note  is  the  divergence  between  males  and
emales  in  auction  bids  as  shown  in  Fig.  2.  Table  9  substanti-
tes  these  differences  between  WOMEN  and  MEN  (W--M)  by
howing  many  cells  with  a W,  and  just  a  few  with  an  M,  and
or  low  values.
MEN  seem  to  underbid  looking  for  a  greater  proﬁt
hereas  WOMEN  adjust  their  bids  much  more  to  their  values.
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Table  9  Difference  in  average  bid:  Women  vs  Men  (W--M).  Signiﬁcant  at  0.10,  *;  at  0.05,  **;  at  0.01,  ***.
Value  Total  PRO  STU  FIR  VIC
0--1  −0.24  −0.53  −0.03  −0.69  0.02
1--2 0.43  W*  0.42  0.40  0.01  0.87  W*
2--3 −0.62  −1.53  M*  −0.17  −0.38  −0.91
3--4 1.10  W**  0.75  1.20  W*  1.12  W***  0.86
4--5 0.51 −0.40 0.89  W**  0.76  W**  0.13
5--6 0.55 −0.07 0.77 W*  1.03  W**  0.25
6--7 1.24 W*** −0.57 2.31 W***  0.94  W**  1.68  W**
7--8 0.71 W* −0.24 1.37 W**  0.49 0.99
8--9 1.55  W***  0.25  2.19  W***  1.38  W***  1.73  W**
9--10 0.60  −0.25  0.86  0.71  0.52
10--11 1.39  W**  1.22  1.61  W**  1.25  W*  1.51  W*
11--12 1.06  W**  0.46  1.39  W**  1.44  W*  0.64
12--13 0.85  W*  −0.42  1.50  W**  0.65  1.06
13--14 −0.28  −0.09  −0.41  0.05  −0.62
14--15 0.97  −0.49  1.57  W*  −0.04  2.27  W*
15--16 0.34  0.98  W**  −0.02  −0.44  2.08  W**
16--17 −0.51  −0.69  −0.33  0.70  −1.33
17--18 1.31  W**  −0.11  2.19  W***  0.84  1.65  W**
18--19 1.93  W***  2.43  W*  1.69  W**  0.86  3.08  W***
19--20 0.96  −0.63  1.87  W**  0.85  1.26
Value FIR  PRO  FIR  STU  VIC  PRO  VIC  STU
0--1  −0.06  −0.99  −0.58  0.58
1--2 −0.04  0.10  0.65  0.77
2--3 −1.26  M***  0.09  −1.80  −0.46
3--4 0.68  1.26  W***  0.63  1.10
4--5 −0.03  1.18  W***  −0.92  M*  0.35
5--6 −0.68  1.67  W***  0.26  0.22
6--7 −0.18  1.69  W***  −0.92  3.04  W***
7--8 −1.26  M*  1.56  W***  1.00  1.14
8--9 0.86  1.65  W***  −0.99  2.84  W***
9--10 −0.20  1.31  −0.42  0.51
10--11 0.68  1.68  1.28  1.41
11--12 0.83  1.71  0.12  0.96
12--13 −0.09  0.99  −0.75  2.07  W*
13--14 −0.44  0.39  0.42  −1.28
14--15 −0.80 0.44  0.79  2.81  W*
15--16 0.46  W***  −0.93  1.83  1.75  W*
16--17 1.27  0.16  −1.74  −0.69
17--18 0.14  1.23  −0.02  2.77  W**
18--19 1.02 1.09  4.11  W**  2.44  W**
19--20 −1.72  2.31  W**  0.50  1.46
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T
che  differences  are  even  more  important  for  STUDENTS.  For
ROFESSIONALS,  even  if  the  bids  are  the  same  on  average,
he  STUDENTS  bids  are  higher  for  high  values.  The  same
appens  for  VICKREY  auctions.
It  is  usually  assumed  that  WOMEN  tend  to  overbid  with
espect  to  MEN  (Dechenaux  et  al.,  2012)  but  it  is  not  clear
f  that  fact  is  due  to  their  bigger  risk  aversion  coefﬁcient
nd  lower  competitiveness  (Price  and  Sheremeta,  2012),
heir  higher  valuation  for  winning  (Ong  and  Chen,  2013),
r  their  speed  to  learning  in  new  environments  (Ham  and
agel,  2006).  Also,  biological  effects  have  been  indicated  to
xplain  this  behaviour  (Chen  et  al.,  2013).  In  any  case,  what
b
u
l
ms  for  real  is  that  WOMEN  students  bid  closer  to  their  value
n  all  types  of  auctions  (Table  9).
. Conclusions
he  starting  point  of  this  research  is  the  learning  pro-
ess  associated  with  the  acquisition  of  a  speciﬁc  knowledge
y  current  managerial  employees  of  an  energy  company
sing  laboratory  experiments.  The  next  step  is  the  trans-
ation  of  this  process  at  the  University  level  to  future
anagers  in  order  to  ﬁnd  out  if  this  laboratory  environment
BB
B
B
C
C
C
C
D
D
D
F
G
G
G
H
H
J
K
K
KDo  current  and  future  managers  think  alike?  
is  appropriate  for  the  transmission  of  theoretical  and  applied
concepts.  In  addition,  it  is  worthy  to  know  if  the  acquired
knowledge  is  also  suitable  to  mimic  those  of  real  managers.
From  an  educational  perspective,  computer-assisted
learning  is  based  on  classroom  experiments  in  which  the
dynamics  of  the  games  are  thoroughly  explained  and  the
interaction  by  the  instructors  is  feasible.  Auction  simulators
have  been  extensively  used  in  teaching  and  research  in  com-
putational  and  experimental  economics  (Kagel  and  Roth,
2011),  showing  that  these  simulators  might  be  particularised
ad  hoc  for  the  real  situation.  Auction  games  are  played  in  the
computer  to  facilitate  the  introduction  of  variability  among
the  values  that  are  randomly  assigned  to  the  players  or  to
incorporate  with  ease  and  use  different  ‘‘realistic’’  exam-
ples  within  the  same  classroom  session.  For  example,  the
professors  might  participate  in  the  auction  just  to  break
the  market  and  demonstrate  how  to  create  a  monopolistic
behaviour  or  how  collusion  works.
There  has  been  an  attempt  therefore  to  identify  further
educational  efforts  to  indicate  to  the  students  what  knowl-
edge  the  companies  demand  to  their  managers.  The  result
has  been  very  satisfying  as  for  acceptance  by  both  groups  of
the  experimental  setting  as  a  teaching  environment.
The  aim  in  this  research  is  to  go  one  step  further  and  com-
pare  the  behaviour  of  the  students  and  the  professionals  in
an  effort  to  contrast  if  the  computer  assisted  tool  is  appro-
priate  for  teaching  professionals-to-be  (Pfahl  et  al.,  2004),
or  there  are  important  differences  between  professionals
and  students  (Palacios-Huerta  and  Volij,  2008).
The  results  are  consistent  with  the  literature  since  it
was  expected  that  the  PROFESSIONAL  bid  higher  than  the
STUDENTS,  WOMEN  bid  higher  than  MEN,  and  there  are  no
clear-cut  differences  across  auction  types.  Our  main  contri-
bution  is  that  the  experimental  setting  has  been  prepared
for  a  speciﬁc  real  case,  that  of  LNG  off-loading,  and  that  the
professionals  that  have  participated  are  current  managers  in
the  speciﬁc  sector.  Students,  on  their  hand,  are  managers-
to-be  studying  Economics  or  Business  Administration.
As  for  future  research,  it  will  be  appropriate  to  perform
additional  experiments  so  as  to  obtain  more  samples,  adding
several  more  degrees  of  freedom  to  the  design.  For  exam-
ple,  it  looks  reasonable  to  further  explain  the  experiment
to  the  participants,  even  providing  the  theoretical  bidding
functions  prior  to  the  sessions,  so  they  have  a  clearer  strat-
egy.
Professionals  have  also  asked  for  a  variation  on  the  exper-
iment  to  better  represent  reality.  It  is  our  aim  to  develop
with  them  an  experiment  in  which  bounded  rationality  might
be  separated  from  misperceptions.
It  will  also  be  very  interesting  to  mix  professionals  in
the  same  session  to  see  if  their  bidding  behaviour  changes
with  the  composition  of  the  groups.  Smaller  groups  will  for
sure  dictate  a  different  way  of  bidding  between  current  and
future  managers.
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